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ABSTRACT 
Widespread attention is recently paid upon RFID system structure considering its ease of deployment 
over an extensive range of applications. Due to its several advantages, many technical articles are 
published to improve its capabilities over specific system implementations. Recently, a lightweight anti-
de-synchronization RFID authentication protocol and a lightweight binding proof protocol to guard 
patient safety are proposed. This contribution provides enough evidence to prove the first introduced 
protocol vulnerability to de-synchronization attack. It also provides the other protocol's suffering from 
de-synchronization attack as well as tracking the movements of the tags. This paper also addresses 
appropriate solutions to fix the security flaws concerning the two described protocols for secure RFID 
applications.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Today, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) plays an important and popular role in variety of 
applications explicitly for its system implementation design and the ease of manufacturing. It 
provides identifying, target tracking, ambient condition sensing, guarding patient safety etc. 
So many system-wise demandable advantages justify the means to choose the RFID system 
improvements as an interesting research subject. This is indeed noticeable throughout the 
literature on RFID [1, 2]. 
Furthermore, within RFID system structure context, many lightweight RFID authentication 
protocols [3-5] and grouping proof protocols [6-8] are proposed to be implemented over the 
practically required secure RFID channels. Recently, the grouping proof protocol is adopted to 
improve patient safety. It avoids death due to medication related errors, but such protocols 
suffer from de-synchronization as well as replay attacks [7, 8]. However, many security 
requirements such as tag synchronization together with privacy cannot be preserved by most of 
the published protocols for lightweight authentication scheme [9-14].  
In 2010, Zhuo et al. proposed a lightweight anti-de-synchronization RFID authentication 
protocol [15]. They claimed their protocol would be secure against all attacks on RFID systems. 
However, in 2010, Yu et al. proposed a real lightweight binding proof protocol to guard the 
patient safety. Their protocol doesn't employ any complicated security algorithms but use only 
simple logic gates such as AND and XOR operations. They claimed that their proposed grouping 
proof protocol can resist against de-synchronization and replay attacks and can also support tag 
anonymity [16]. 
However, this contribution reveals Zhuo et al’s protocol vulnerability to de-synchronization 
attack. We show Yu et al’s protocol is also vulnerable to de-synchronization attack and is not 
secure against tracking the movements of the tags.  This paper also proposes solutions to fix the 
security flaws just explained for both protocols.  
Moreover, the next section reviews Zhuo et al.'s lightweight authentication protocol and its 
weakness, to propose appropriate solutions against the vulnerable attack. In section 3, Yuo et 
al.'s lightweight binding proof protocol with its weaknesses is described, and the proposed 
solutions are provided to resist the protocol from de-synchronization attack as well as tracking 
the movements of the tags. Finally, section 4 provides the full research work summary. 
 
2. ZHUO ET AL.'S LIGHTWEIGHT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
(WEAKNESS AND SOLUTION) 
 
2.1. A Review of Zhuo et al.'s Lightweight Authentication Protocol 
Zhuo et al. proposed a lightweight anti-de-synchronization RFID authentication protocol [15]. 
In their procedure, tags are passive and they only need to have a secure one-way hash function 
(i.e. a H(.) function) and Exclusive-OR operations. They assume each tag (e.g., the ith tag) 
shares a secret key, ikey , with the backend server and each secret key is indexed by a unique 
index-pseudonym iIDS  as well as a unique serial number iC in the associated i
th
 tag backend 
server data base. Each tag also stores a random secret parameter iT which is only known by the 
ith tag. There are six steps in Zhuo et al's lightweight authentication protocol that are briefly 
described below and shown in Figure 1 for justification purposes only: 
Step1. A reader generates a random number r to transmit it to ith tag. 
 
Step2. Upon reception of r by the ith tag, the tag computes )( ii keyHIDS =  , )( rTHa i ⊕=  and 
)( ii CarkeyHm ⊕⊕⊕= .  
It then sends iIDS , a and the left part of the calculated massage parameter m, known as 
m-left, back to the reader.  
At the same time, the random secret parameter iT  is updated employing the right part 
of m as )( rightmTH i −⊕ . 
 
Step3. After receiving the },,{ leftmaIDSi − by the reader, it transmit },,,{ leftmaIDSr i −
 
to the 
backend server.  
 
Step4. Based on iIDS  received, the backend server first retrieves the corresponding 
information of the tag, i.e.
 
ikey  and
 
iC , from the local database and performs a 
comparison as leftCarkeyHleftm ii −⊕⊕⊕=− )(
?
. If the notation is satisfied, then the 
backend server chooses a random number R and computes )( aRkeyHn i ⊕⊕= .  
Now, the backend server sends R and n-right part to the reader and so computes 
leftnkeykey ii −⊕='  and )'(' ii keyHIDS = .  
Finally, ikey  and iIDS  will be updated as ikey '  and iIDS '  respectively. The backend 
server stores old and new values of },{ ii IDSkey in its database to prevent de-
synchronization problem.  
 
Step5. This is the step that the reader has received R and n-right part, so it sends them to the ith 
tag.    
 
Step6. Upon the reception of R and n-right part, the tag does the comparison 
with rightaRkeyHrightn i −⊕⊕=− )(
?
. If the notation is satisfied, then the tag 
computes leftnkeykey ii −⊕='  and )'(' ii keyHIDS = . Finally, ikey
 
and iIDS will be 
updated as ikey '  and iIDS '  respectively for the next readers’ call time. 
 
 
Figure 1. Communication flow for Zhuo et al.'s protocol [15] 
 
 
2.2. Weakness of Zhuo et al's Lightweight Authentication Protocol 
Unfortunately, the described Zhuo et al's protocol is obviously vulnerable to de-synchronization 
attack. This can be observed by making a trivial assumption that the attacker can observe and 
manipulate communication link between the tags and the reader. This attack can be performed 
as follows;  
An attacker eavesdrops {a, r, m-left, IDSi} by the last execution. Later, when the reader sends a 
random number r' to the tag for the next execution, the attacker has intercepted it from the 
reader before forwarding it to the tag. Then, the attacker can reply to the reader instead of the 
tag, using the parameters obtained from the last execution (i.e. a reply attack). In this context, 
the attacker computes arra ⊕⊕= ''  and then sends a', iIDS and m-left (in last execution) to 
the reader. Hence, since
 
arra ⊕=⊕ '' , so the authentication is correctly performed which is 
in fact to equalize
 
)''()( iiii CarkeyHCarkeyH ⊕⊕⊕=⊕⊕⊕ . Therefore, the backend server 
updates iIDS and ikey . 
Such an attack on a tag causes loss of synchronization between the tag and the backend server 
as shown in Figure 2. Later, when the attacked tag wants to use its key and unique index-
pseudonym, the backend server identifies the tag as an illegal tag. Because, when the backend 
server does the comparisons 
?
1( ) ( )i old i newIDS IDS= and 2
?
1 )()( newinewi IDSIDS = , undoubtedly the 
notations are not satisfied as it was expected. So, naturally the backend server rejects the valid 
tag.
 
 
 
Figure 2. De-synchronization attack on Zhuo et al.'s protocol 
 
In fact, the vulnerability of Zhuo et al's protocol that is employed through the mentioned attack 
is a result of the protocol using the operation ⊕  in m. So, the attacker can change the value of a 
corresponding to r' sent by the reader. To overcome against the described attack, the tag must 
compute m in the form of )||( aCrkeyHm ii ⊕⊕=  instead. (|| presents the concatenation 
operation).   
Suppose that an attacker is going to use m again. Thus, the attacker has to modify m in order to 
show that it is generated using r'. However, the attacker do not know ikey  and iC . Thus, a' 
must be found to satisfy )'||'()||( aCrkeyHaCrkeyH iiii ⊕⊕=⊕⊕ . However, it is 
computationally infeasible since r' and a' contributes to the hash padding. So, the attacking 
aperture is locked up permanently. 
 
 
3. YU ET AL.'S LIGHTWEIGHT BINDING PROOF PROTOCOL (WEAKNESSES 
AND SOLUTIONS) 
 
3.1. A Review of Yu et al.'s Lightweight Binding Proof Protocol 
Yu et al. proposed a lightweight binding proof protocol for medication errors and patient safety 
[16]. In their protocol, they assume each tag (the ith tag) shares k-bits secret keys, 1, ii kX and 
2ik with the backend server. They indexed the secret keys by a k-bits unique index-pseudonym 
iIDS  and a k-bits unique identification number iID . The eight steps in Yu et al's lightweight 
binding proof protocol are briefly described as follows and is shown in Figure 3 for justification 
purposes only. 
Step1. The reader broadcasts "Hello" in its working range. 
 
Step2. When the tags A and B receive the "Hello" message, both tags reply with aIDS  and 
bIDS  accordingly.  
 
Step3. Upon the receptions of aIDS  and bIDS  by the reader, both parameters are then 
attached to the backend server to perform the operations;    
rkIDSA aaa ⊕⊕= 1 , 
k
aaa rkIDSB 2mod))( 2 +∨= ,
 
rkIDSA bbb ⊕⊕= 1  and 
k
bbb rkIDSB 2mod))(( 2 +∨=  (r is a k-bits random number chosen by the backend 
server). At this stage, the reader transmits }||||{ baa IDSBA to the tag A and 
}||||{ abb IDSBA  to the tag B. 
 
Step4. Upon the reception of }||||{ baa IDSBA  by the tag A, it obtains r from aA  and then 
does the comparison with kaaa rkIDSB 2mod))(( 2
?
+∨= . If the notation is satisfied, 
the tag A computes rXIDIDSIDSm kaabaa ⊕+++= )2mod)((  and sends it back 
to the reader. 
 
Step5. When the reader receives am , the reader sends it to the tag B. 
 
Step6. When the tag B receives am , the tag B obtains r from bA  and does the comparison 
with kbbb rkIDSB 2mod))(( 2
?
+∨= . If the notation is satisfied, the tag B computes 
rXIDmm kbbab ⊕++= )2mod)(( and sends it back to the reader. 
 
Step7. The reader now has ),,,( baba mmIDSIDS to connect the tags to the backend server and 
prove tag A and tag B existence in the field simultaneously. 
 
Step8. After the approval process is completed, both tags will embark into the key update 
process. The key update algorithm considering }),{( bai ∈ for 1ik , 2ik  and iIDS  are 
computed as )2mod)(( 21 kiii IDkrk +⊕⊕ , )2mod)(( 12 kiii IDkrk +⊕⊕  and  
k
iii IDrkIDS 2mod))(( 2 ⊕⊕+ , respectively. 
 
 Figure 3. Communication flow for Yu et al.'s protocol [16] 
 
3.2. Weaknesses of Yu et al.'s Lightweight Binding Proof Protocol 
Unfortunately, Yu et al's lightweight binding proof protocol just described is completely 
insecure and is susceptible to several attacks. At this stage, we introduce several attacks to Yu et 
al's protocol to clarify our claim with the assumption that the attacker can observe and 
manipulate communication links between the tags and the reader. 
a. De-synchronization attack 
 
When the reader sends }||||{ baa IDSBA  to the tag A, an attacker can replace aA  and aB with 
}0....10000{' ⊕= aa AA and }0....10000{' ⊕= aa BB respectively ( }0....10000{  is a k-bits vector 
with a one as the most-significant bit and all other bits with zeros).  
So, the tag A obtains }0....10000{' ⊕= rr instead of r, because the tag A computes r as:  
11 }0....10000{' aaaaaa kIDSAkIDSA ⊕⊕⊕=⊕⊕
 
'}0....10000{}0....10000{ 11 rrkIDSrkIDS aaaa =⊕=⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕=
 
Then the tag A does comparison as kaaa rkIDSB 2mod)')((' 2
?
+∨= to check the correctness of 
r'. This comparison is absolutely correct because:  
kk
aa
kk
aaa rkIDSBBB 2mod)2)((2mod)2(}0....10000{' 121 −− ++∨=+=⊕=  
kk
aa
kkk
aa rkIDSrkIDS 2mod}))0....10000{(2mod)((2mod)2(2mod)( 212 ⊕+∨=++∨= −
k
aa
kk
aa rkIDSrkIDS 2mod)')((2mod)'(2mod)(( 22 +∨=+∨=  
So, the tag A obtains }0....10000{' ⊕= rr instead of r and computes 
}0....10000{' ⊕= aa mm instead of am .  
Then, when the tag A sends am' to the reader, the attacker computes }0....10000{' ⊕= aa mm and 
sends am back to the reader. So, the backend server uses r and the tag A uses r' to key update 
processing. Therefore, during the next session, the backend server identifies the tag A as an 
invalid tag (de-synchronization attack). This attack can be performed on the tag B similar to tag 
A too. These two attacks are shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively. 
 
Figure 4. Tag A de-synchronization attack on Yu et al.'s protocol 
 
 
Figure 5. Tag B de-synchronization attack on Yu et al.'s protocol 
 
b. Tracking the movements of the tag 
Consider the attacker has an ability to track the movements of the tags A and B. For this attack, 
it is assumed that the given scheme is performed twice to ensure the attacker the two program 
executions are for the same tags or not. This technique is briefly described as follows:  
It is assumed that the attacker eavesdrops the values of ),,,( baba mmIDSIDS  by two 
executions, e.g. executions at  i and j. Consequently, the attacker will have 
ibaba mmIDSIDS ),,,(  and jbaba mmIDSIDS ),,,( . Then, it can compute 
k
ababa mIDSIDSmm 2mod))(( −−−⊕ for i and j.  
If the result of kiababa mIDSIDSmm 2mod}){( −−−⊕ is the same as the result 
of kjababa mIDSIDSmm 2mod}){( −−−⊕ , both eavesdropped parameters are executed for 
the same both tags, i.e. for tag A and tag B. This is for the reason that, the result of 
k
ababa mIDSIDSmm 2mod))(( −−−⊕  is the same as the result of 
k
baba XXIDID 2mod)( +++  in all executions for tag A and tag B. 
Since the random number r has no effect on computing Aa, Ba, ma and mb and it is also only used 
with XOR operation, Yu et al's lightweight binding proof protocol is vulnerable against the 
aforementioned attacks. Therefore, to improve Yu et al's lightweight binding proof protocol to 
stand against described attacks, the following changes are recommended for the protocol as 
follows: 
- To prevent de-synchronization attack: 
The backend server computes aA  and aB
 
in the form of 
21 )4,)(( aaaa krkIDSROTA +⊕⊕=  and 2)2,)(( aaa krIDSROTB ++=  and also 
computes  bA  and bB  in form of 21 )4,)(( bbbb krkIDSROTA +⊕⊕=
 
and 2)2,)(( bbb krIDSROTB ++= , respectively.  
),( yxROT is defined to left rotate the value of x with y bits. 
 
- To prevent tracking the movements of the tags:  
The tag A must compute am  in the form of 
rrXIDIDSIDSm kaabaa ⊕++++= )2mod)(( . Also, the tag B must compute bm  in the 
form of rmIDrXm kabbb ⊕++∨= )2mod))((( .  Since r is a random number, the result 
of kababa mIDSIDSmm 2mod))(( −−−⊕  is " kbbaa IDrXrXID 2mod))(( +∨+++ " 
and in fact this is not the same for all executions. Therefore, the attacker cannot track the tag 
movements. 
 
Therefore, such modifications can lead to strengthen the protocol security against the mentioned 
weaknesses, i.e. de-synchronization attack and tracking the movements of the tags. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The investigations over two recently lightweight protocols for RFID system show that they 
suffer from many serious security weaknesses in spite of claims given by the protocols pioneers. 
These problems are found to be the two attacks called de-synchronization attack and tracking 
the movements of the tags. This contribution is indeed to prevent such given protocols security 
weaknesses employing concatenation operation on the first protocol and rotation process on the 
second protocol. Hence, with these improvements, both Zhou et al.'s and Yu et al.'s protocols 
can be used for secure RFID applications such as identifying and guarding patient safety.   
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